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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

SCENTS, SENSE OR CENTS?; SOMETHING STINKS IN THE
LANHAM ACT

SCIENTIFIC OBSTACLES TO SCENT MARKS

DOUGLAS D. CHUROVICH*
It might well be true, as Shakespeare has suggested, that a rose by any
other name would smell as sweet.1 Yet does it necessarily follow that a rose
by any other name would point to source? Evidently so, if the rose is instead
plumeria blossoms. Reasoning that the Trademark Act of 1946 (the “Lanham
Act”) was intended to liberalize trademark law, and relying upon favorable
comparisons between scents and both colors and sounds (both having already
been granted trademark status), in 1990, the Trademark Trial and Appeal
Board in In re Clarke reviewed and approved an application to protect the
“fresh scent of plumeria blossoms,” over the rejection of the Trademark
To-date, no federal court has directly addressed the
Examiner.2
appropriateness of designating or recognizing scents per se as trademarks.3
However, an exploration of osphresiology,4 the science of smells, reveals
dramatic distinctions between the properties of scents and the properties of
both colors and sounds that frustrate the implementation and use of scents as
trademarks, and thereby undermine In re Clarke. In the context of trademark
use, these properties create overwhelming obsticles to trademark enforcement
and present substantial administrative difficulties, while offering trademarks
with very little real commercial benefit. Consequently, as will be shown, the
landmark In re Clarke decision was ill-advised since it was founded upon a
*Attorney with the intellectual property law firm of Polster, Lieder, Woodruff & Lucchesi, L.C.
in Saint Louis, Missouri.
1. During the famous balcony scene in Romeo and Juliet, Juliet cries, “What’s in a name?
That which we call a rose, by any other name would smell as sweet.” WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE,
ROMEO AND JULIET, act 2, sc. 2.
2. In re Clarke, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1238, 1239 (T.T.A.B. 1990).
3. In Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., the Supreme Court examined the issue of
color marks, and without direct comment referred to the In re Clarke decision as an example of
existent non-traditional trademarks. 514 U.S. 159, 162 (1995).
4. See CULTIVATION AND UTILIZATION OF AROMATIC PLANTS 815 (C.K. Atal & B.M.
Kapur eds., 1989), available at http://www.vedamsbooks.com/no9168.htm (last visited June 11,
2001).
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poor, if not non-existent, understanding of osphresiology and the misguided
application of legal principles that fail to apply to scents. Simply put, scents
should not be afforded the status or protections of trademarks under the
Lanham Act.
I. INTRODUCTION
A.

Questions In The Air

Could a retailer, under the Lanham Act, be enjoined from placing one
manufacturer’s scented yarn on a shelf next to another manufacturer’s
packaged pouporri? Or for that matter, next to cigars or cigarettes? Could the
same retailer be restricted from eating a limburger cheese sandwich in the
vicinity of a display containing that same yarn? Would employees, handling
and selling the yarn, be forced to wear unscented deodorants and perfumes?
Now that a trademark has been registered for a fragrance added by a
manufacturer to her yarn, any or all of these situations could conceivably
violate the misrepresentation provisions of the Lanham Act.5 Yet, as
unreasonable as these scenarios may appear, each is only further complicated
when multiple products and scent marks are present.
Of course, even in this simple example, each of the scenarios raises one or
more significant trademark issue, such as infringement (is one product’s scent
too similar to another’s, even if on entirely different goods?); depletion (are all
the “best” scents already taken?); dilution (which and how many scent marks
can be brought to a specific market without weakening a competing strong
mark?); federal guidelines for labeling laws (is the labeling invalid when a
scent mark loses its potency?); and unfair competition (can one scent mark
legally mask, overpower, or interfere with another?). Clearly, an unlimited
number of scenarios can be imagined which could lead to these and other legal
questions the Lanham Act is not equipped to resolve.
Perhaps these fictitious scenarios are exaggerated; perhaps not. The
following exploration of the unique nature of scents and their relation to
protection as trademarks will reveal how such claims may not be beyond the
realm of possibility or reason, and how underlying fundamental assimilation
problems reasonably justify a refusal to extend trademark protection to scents.
B.

In re Clarke: Quite a Yarn.

In the landmark case In re Clarke, an applicant, Celia Clark d/b/a Clarke’s
OSEWEZ, filed for trademark protection for a scent having the following
description: “The mark is a high impact, fresh, flora fragrance reminiscent of

5. Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1989).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2001]

SCENTS, SENSE OR CENTS?

295

Plumeria blossoms,” for “sewing thread and embroidery yarn.”6 The
Trademark Examiner refused registration, initially based on two criteria: (1)
“the scent does not function as a trademark because it does not identify or
distinguish applicant’s good from those of others”; and (2) the scent is de jure
functional.7 On appeal to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, the
Examiner dropped the second basis and only argued the first.8 It is significant
to note that the Examiner’s de jure functionality argument posited that the
scent should not be granted trademark protection “because of the competitive
need for free access to pleasant scents or fragrances.”9 Accordingly, the Board
merely discussed the associative link between the applicant’s particular scent
and her product, and did not even address the question of the adverse impact
on competitiveness the registration of a scent mark would cause.
Ms. Clarke presented an affidavit to argue that, to her knowledge, her
products were the only yarns and threads on the market that were scented, and
that she had advertised the fact that her products were scented.10 Ms. Clarke
further asserted that her customers favorably associate her products with the
plumeria blossom scent and that her scent was distinctive because it was not
otherwise associated with thread and yarn, and because competitors could use
other scents, “such as that of a lily of the valley, a carnation or a rose.”11
Apparently relying on the Owens-Corning decision, Ms. Clarke then continued
to compare scents to colors, and in particular, pink fiberglass insulation.12 The
Examiner, likewise, relied upon a comparison between scents and colors as the
basis of argument, and went goes so far as to concede that there is no “inherent
bar” to registering scent trademarks.13 Furthermore, the Examiner conceded
(erroneously, as the reader will learn later in this commentary) that “if
applicant’s scent does function to indicate origin, potential consumers may
readily be able to distinguish among the vast array of scents in identifying
competing sources of goods.”14
Instead, the Examiner merely argued that scents are not the type of feature
consumers typically use to associate with the source of a product, and that Ms.
Clarke had not “specifically promoted the particular scent as an indication of
origin.”15 Owing to the evidence in Ms. Clarke’s affidavit, uncontroverted by

6. In re Clarke, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1238 (Ms. Clarke’s Application No. 758,429 was filed on
Oct. 18, 1988).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. In re Clarke, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1238.
11. Id. at 1239 (quoting Applicant’s brief at p.13).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. In re Clarke, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1239 (emphasis in original).
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the Examiner, the Board rejected the Examiner’s arguments, finding that the
scent did serve to identify source and that Ms. Clarke had established a prima
facie case of distinctiveness for the scent.16 The Board reversed the
Examiner’s refusal to register.17 No further appeal has been taken.
C. The Underlying Purpose Of The Lanham Act
1. Realization
In recommending passage of the Lanham Act, the Senate Committee on
Patents identified two fundamental goals underlying any trademark legislation;
first, the public must be protected from confusion among products in
commerce, and second, the goodwill of manufacturers and merchants must be
protected.18 To all parties in a bona fide transaction, these goals underscore the
importance of conveying accurate and reliable product source information
from seller to purchaser. However, prior to enactment of the Lanham Act,
conflicts among existing state and federal unfair competition statutes, coupled
with restrictive court interpretations contrary to consumer protection and
evolving business demands severely hampered success in obtaining these
legislative goals.19 Moving beyond the Trademark Act of 1905, the drafters of
the Lanham Act sought to liberalize and expand existing trademark protection
in order to keep pace with modern business practices.20 Yet the legislation had
to maintain a balance between the two conflicting interests of protecting both
consumers and business good will, while limiting interference with legitimate
competition.
2. Liberalization
A liberal approach to trademark legislation, as envisioned by the Senate
Committee on Patents, was adopted, and incorporated directly into the
sweeping language of the Lanham Act.21 Accordingly, the statute defines a
trademark in broad terms, as “any word, symbol, or device of any combination
thereof [which a manufacturer or a merchant uses] to identify and distinguish
his or her goods . . . from those manufactured or sold by another . . .”22
Drafted in 1946, the definition’s plain language provided an umbrella of
protection for virtually all traditional trademarks recognized in the time period,
including product names, logo’s, and identification tags. Notably, scents were

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. at 1239-40.
Id. at 1240.
S. REP. NO. 1333, pt. 1, at 4 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Lanham Act, supra note 5.
Id.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2001]

SCENTS, SENSE OR CENTS?

297

not specifically named as potential trademarks in the Lanham Act definition,
and until the In re Clarke decision, were not favored with protection.
However, just as changes in business practices created a demand for better
protection that ultimately lead to the Lanham Act, new and emerging
marketing demands have since pushed for even more liberal interpretation of
the terms within the Act that define a trademark. One indication has been the
recent approval, in the famous Owens-Corning decision, of trademark
protection for color per se in which the Court stated, “The purpose of the
Lanham Act was the modernization of trademark law, to facilitate commerce
and to protect the consumer.”23 Building upon, and perhaps encouraged by the
Owens-Corning decision, the Trademark Review Commission of the United
States Trademark Association, on reviewing the Lanham Act in 1987 declared
that the terms “symbol, or device” should be read “expansively” and should
not in themselves preclude the registration of, inter alia, “smells.”24 Thus,
through an evolution of judicial statutory interpretation, and the Trademark
Commission’s expansive interpretation, scents (a.k.a. “smells”) per se can now
obtain trademark protection. Unfortunately such protection only frustrates the
intent behind such liberalization.
3. Modernization v. Monopolization
A delicate balance was struck in the Lanham Act to both cope with
evolving business needs and protect the consumer from confusion while
warding off the potential for “fostering hateful monopolies.”25 In promoting
liberalization, the Senate Committee on Patents argued that trademarks do not
truly grant limited monopoly rights to owners, but rather enhance commerce
by aiding consumers in the purchase selection process.26 So stated, the
fundamental intent of trademarks, to promote the dissemination of accurate
source information to the relevant segment of the public, doubtless rings true
and will encounter few detractors for the vast majority of trademarks.
However, in attempting to keep pace with market demands, the Lanham
Act, as expanded by the Trademark Review Commission’s interpretation,
severely strains the boundaries of the trademark protection envelope. In so
doing, it threatens to overreach the basic intent behind trademarks and
threatens its own internal balance. When protection is granted for product
features that approach the boundaries of the envelope, the distinctions between
trademark protection and monopolization begin to blur and the Committee’s
argument weakens. When at the boundary itself, even a slight misstep in

23. In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d 1116, 1119 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
24. The U.S. Trademark Assoc. Trademark Review Comm. Report and Recommendations to
USTA President and Board of Directors, 77 T.M.R. 375, 421 (Sept.-Oct. 1987).
25. S. REP. NO. 1333, supra note 18, at 2.
26. Id.
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interpretation or legal application can inadvertently result in the creation of a
monopoly.
4. Consternation
In the case of scents, the boundary has been met and surpassed. The
Trademark Review Commission’s broad interpretation of the definition of
trademarks under the Lanham Act was adopted and incorporated into caselaw
by the In re Clarke decision, in which the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
utilized the Commission’s inclusion of scents as potential trademarks to justify
its approval of registering a fragrance added to yarn and thread.27 One might
anticipate, as did Clarke’s attorneys, that since the intent of the liberalization of
trademark law was to respond to rational needs of evolving business practice,
that In re Clarke would have opened the floodgates to a wave of registrations
for scent-oriented trademarks.28 Further, that if, as proposed here, scent marks
may actually afford the registrant a monopolistic grant, products would soon
be enhanced by perfumes and fragrances. However, little commercial interest
has been generated by the decision as there have been few scent marks filed,29

27. In re Clarke, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1240.
28. Malcolm Gladwell, Trademark - Picks Up the Scent; Thread’s Smell Gets Legal
Registration, WASH. POST, Dec. 4, 1990, at Al5.
29. To-date, there have only been ten (10) applications filed for scent marks, by only four (4)
separate applicants:

Scent

Goods

Filed

First Applicant
74-720993

cherry

lubricants, fuel and oil
additives

Aug 25, 1995

Opposition Pending

75-404020

almond

fuel additives

Dec 11, 1997

Abandoned

75-360106

tutti-frutti

fuel additives

Sept 19, 1997

Abandoned

75-360105

citrus

fuel additives

Sept 19, 1997

Abandoned

75-360103

bubble gum

fuel additives

Sept 19, 1997

Abandoned

75-360104

rape

fuel additives

Sept 19, 1997

Allowed Feb 5, 2001

75-360102

strawberry

fuel additives

Sept 19, 1997

Allowed Feb 14, 2001

Serial No.

Status
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and no further opinions have been published regarding scent marks. The
solution to this apparent enigma lies in the nature of scents themselves.
II. OSPHRESIOLOGY AND THE ESSENCE OF SCENTS
Osphresiology30 is an extremely complex and generally overlooked science
that embodies analysis of properties that reach to the very core of trademark
protectability for scents under the Lanham Act. Accordingly, before the merits
and implications of conferring trademark protection to scents can properly be
assessed, the basic elements of osphresiology must be explored and
understood.
A.

Vibration Theory

The foundation of osphresiology rests upon a concept known as vibration
theory. Within this theory exist two principle aspects; first, the creation of a
stimulus at a molecular level, and second, the body’s method of detecting the
stimulus so created.
Virtually all substances, to varying degrees, release molecules possessing
excess energy into the atmosphere in an excited state commonly referred to as
“gaseous.”31 Bouncing about from atom to atom, this excess molecular energy
forces the molecule’s chemical bonds, bound by elastic forces, to stretch and
distort in a multitude of directions, only to rebound like a rubber band, and
thereby create repetitive vibrations.32 These vibrations are constrained to
specific frequency modes determined by the atomic and chemical
interrelationships among the atoms in the molecule. Consequently, each
molecule creates its own distinct and consistently repeatable pattern of
frequencies.33 Taken as a whole, the vibration patterns are as unique to a
molecule type as fingerprints are to humans, and utilizing infrared absorption
spectroscopy, a plot, just as unique and representative of each molecule type,

Second Applicant
75-301972

apple

leather bit for animals

June 2, 1997

Pending

Third Applicant
75-120036

lemon

toner cartridges

June 17, 1997

Allowed July 17,1997

Fourth Applicant
76-079064

bubble gum

lubricants & fuels,
chemicals

June 20, 2000

Pending

30.
31.
32.
33.

See CULTIVATION AND UTILIZATION OF AROMATIC PLANTS, supra note 4.
R. H. WRIGHT, THE SENSE OF SMELL 19 (1982).
Id.
Id.
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can readily be obtained.34 These vibration patterns can potentially be sensed
by any observer near the source.
Situated in the olfactory cavities of the human nose are the sensory organs
known as “receptors” that actually detect and sense odors.35 When a gaseous
molecule makes physical contact with one or more of these receptors, a
transfer occurs in which the receptor either removes or adds to the molecule’s
excess energy level in discrete bundles corresponding to the molecule’s modal
vibration frequencies.36 This vibration energy transfer is then registered as an
encoded pattern by the receptor, and the brain cross-references the pattern
against its existing database for a potential correlation and identification or,
alternatively, for comparison to known scents.37 The sensory phenomenon
known as a “scent” is made up of this entire systematic process encompassed
in vibration theory.
The complexity of molecular structures and chemical bonds, and the
physics that define their associations, dictate that the energy transfer plots for
various scents are at the same time random and discrete.38 As a result, there
exists no spectrum among scents which allows for relational comparative
analyses of either individual scents or series of scents.39 Simply put, each
scent is discretely unique, and only random vibrational similarities between
different molecule types offer the potential for comparative analysis.
B.

Aspects And Application of Vibration Theory

In order for a scent to be detected by a human, the gaseous molecules must
travel from their source to the location of the potential observer. Since the
molecules must make actual contact with the observer, the potential for
detection will be inextricably bound and limited to the general vicinity of their
source, and the potency of the scent will diminish in an exponential manner the
further the observer is from that source. Consequently, at some distance,
owing to dispersion and dilution physics, augmented by the effects of depletion
at the source, the potency of the scent will ultimately reach undetectable levels.
A great many variables may enter the equation when attempting to determine
the actual potency and range limitations for any scent under any given set of
circumstances, including, but not limited to, molecular size and weight,
volume of the source, chemical reactivity, environmental conditions, and the
presence of other gaseous chemicals.40 Accordingly, complications in scent

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id. at 27.
Id. at 107.
WRIGHT, supra note 31, at 51.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 111.
See, e.g., id. at 122, 147-49.
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recognition due to such factors generally manifest themselves in proximity
effects.
The complicated nature of scents lends itself to a myriad of unique
identification and recognition difficulties of particular interest to the inclusion
of scents as trademarks. First, temperature, humidity, and wind conditions can
all strengthen or weaken the potency of a scent.41 With a grasp of the
mechanisms underlying scents, each of these factors can readily be assessed at
an intuitive level. Clearly, if heat adds energy to an environment and causes
temperatures to rise, molecules will become more active and the potential for
scents to propagate will increase and occasion a corresponding increase in the
potency of those scents. However, the addition of too much heat can cause an
over-excitement of the molecules and result in distorted vibrational modes and
chemical changes that will alter the scent produced. In contrast to heat, since
humidity is no more than a measure of the amount of moisture in the
atmosphere, an increase in humidity equates to more water molecules in the
air, making it more difficult for scent molecules to propagate and dampening
the potency of nearby scents. As far as wind is concerned, anyone who has
tried to locate the source of an odor in drafty conditions will testify as to the
confusion caused by the scent’s wafting in different directions.
These fundamental effects are further complicated by a series of more
insidious, yet equally significant effects that arise when two or more sources of
scents are in close proximity to one another. Gaseous molecules from one
source can affect the scents produced by gaseous molecules from a second
source through physical, chemical and/or physiological interference. From a
physical standpoint, the molecules of the first scent can entirely mask the
second scent by desensitizing the olfactory receptors and preventing the second
scent’s molecules from transmitting any encoded signals to the brain.42 In such
a situation the potential exists for a single source to completely negate the
scents produced by a neighboring source. Should the two gaseous molecules
be chemically reactive, the two may form a new compound with either an
entirely different scent or no discernible scent at all.43 In a similar vein, should
both scents reach the olfactory receptors in tact, it is possible for the scents to
blend and send a single, mixed pattern to the brain; in essence creating a
different scent altogether.44 As illustrated, the simple act of placing one item
with a scent in close proximity to another may create a condition with the
potential to adversely impact one or both of the scents. Yet, as confusing as all
this may be, these effects are understandably compounded, and the possibility

41.
42.
43.
44.

WRIGHT, supra note 31, at 45.
Id. at 34.
Id. at 26.
Id. at 34.
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for even more confusion arises, when more than two scent sources are present
in the same vicinity.
Finally, even spectral analysis of scents fails to provide a safe harbor for
trademark registration comparisons. Studies have indicated that in some cases
a molecule having as few as three infrared absorption plot peaks matching
those of a second molecule may create a replecant scent, discerned by humans
as nearly identical to the scent created by the second molecule.45 Although a
quantitative study has not been conducted to identify the extent of this
phenomenon, the fact that it exists at all presents disturbing and until further
examined, lingering questions concerning the degree of certainty scent
recognition can be afforded.
Each of the foregoing modification factors may originate through common
everyday occurrences such as the placement of a scented object in a drafty
room, or next to an ashtray, or even next to a window. Yet even on an
individual basis, each can have a dramatic, and in some cases, a catastrophic
effect upon a given scent from an analytic and quantitative standpoint. While
such complications represent significant tangible detection and recognition
difficulties that must be addressed when discussing Lanham Act protection for
scent, the qualitative and subjective aspects of scents also bears consideration.
C. Memory Association And Scents
Complicating the study of osphresiology are the lesser understood human
elements of memory association and sensitivity. At the core of human scent
recognition and memory association is a primal, and some believe instinctive,
warning system that operates on both conscious and subconscious levels to
alert the individual to potentially life-or-death changes in the immediate
environment.46 The term “memory associations” connotes the fact that scents
have no independent identity, but rather must be associated with other
memories to enable recall.47 Unlike general memories, which are merely tied
to the conscious mind and readily updated, scent memory associations often
last a lifetime and are exceedingly difficult to replace with revised
associations.48 Yet at the same time these memory associations are very
limited in that the number of actual scents an individual can store in memory
has been shown, by some estimates, to be as low as sixteen.49 As a result, the
vast majority of scents are remembered in a secondary subjective manner,
relative only to how they compare to other scents. Since an individual’s actual
scent memory associations are themselves relationally based, most memories

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 83.
TRYGG ENGEN, ODOR SENSATION AND MEMORY 10 (1991).
Id. at 6.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 9.
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of scents are little more than a memory of a comparison to a memory of an
impression.
Furthermore, detection and accurate recognition of scents depends heavily
upon individual sensitivity, an ability that can be affected by a number of
personal variables. Some of the more pertinent variables can be classified into
two categories that include natural predispositions, such as physical and mental
peculiarities, and the state of an individual’s personal health.
At an elementary level, differences in physical and psychological makeup
provide some individuals with greater sensitivity to scents than others, and that
sensitivity can be of a general or specific nature.50 This bears particular
consideration in that existing scent memory associations, coupled with
physical olfactory limitations, will generally cause an individual to associate
scents similar to those associations in ways that correspond to personal
memories.51 Hence, deeply ingrained personal attitudes lead individuals to
unwittingly superimpose their own latent impressions upon their memories of
specific scents. While this process may be necessary to allow the individual to
remember a given scent, it taints the accuracy of that scent memory and clouds
the effectiveness of attempting to compare that scent with another individual’s
recollection of the same scent. Adding to the potential for confusion is the
human capacity for adaptation, which manifests with regard to scents in the
body’s ability to ignore a scent when exposed for some duration.52 Obviously,
an individual can only discern a noticeable scent, and an individual with a
lingering adaptation to a given scent will be severely hampered in identifying
or even detecting that scent until the adaptation wears off.
The possibility that an individual may have slight or severe nasal blockage
due to a headcold or any infection or disease must also be recognized as a
crucial factor in individual sensitivity. Such physical ailments can not only
mask and distort scents, but have the capability of preventing detection of
scents altogether.53 Thus, due to the topical and subjective nature of scent
memory associations, the accuracy of any such memories obtained through the
haze of nasal congestion must surely be doubted. In all fairness, however, it
might be argued that ill health represents an anomaly to the norm, and thus
cannot be properly considered in this analysis. Yet this only begs the question
of just where the norm lies. For although acute anosmia (loss of smell) has

50. Gladwell, supra note 28, at 115.
51. ENGEN, supra note 46, at 79.
52. Id. at 18. Continued exposure to a scent can result in adaptation, a condition in which the
perception of scent intensity will steadily decrease to virtual insensitivity, while the actual
intensity remains constant. This phenomenon apparently spans the distance between the physical
and psychological; some researchers claim receptors become desensitized, while others claim the
brain filters out the repetitive patterns.
53. Id. at 101.
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been described as a disability affecting only three percent of the population,54
milder ailments, such as colds, influenza, or allergies, are very common and
should be included as a part of the norm. At the risk of jumping ahead, it
should be noted that although a cold or allergies will have little effect on a
consumer’s ability to discern differences in wordmarks, configuration marks,
or even color or sound trademarks, such common ailments can functionally
impair the consumer who may otherwise rely upon a scent mark. Hence, even
if the average individual suffers from an impaired sense of smell for only two
or three weeks each year due to all of these maladies combined, the potential
for confusion in society at large becomes quite substantial.
The personal modification factors discussed clearly have a dramatic effect
on individual responses to scents in an everyday setting. Studies have revealed
that even when a single scent is presented and recognized by a group of
individuals, the scent will elicit a broad spectrum of reactions, from distaste to
indifference to pleasure.55 Only if the scent is unfamiliar will the group
respond in a similar manner, for due to the primal warning system, an
unfamiliar scent will be perceived with uncertainty and distrust.56 In either
event, any group consensus concerning the perceptions or merely the attributes
of a scent will be virtually unobtainable.
D. Scents v. Colors and Sounds
In light of the greater public awareness of the sciences behind colors and
sounds,57 it is perhaps understandable that analogies are often drawn between
scents and these two more widely recognized sensory mediums that already
enjoy trademark protection in order to justify extending trademark protection
to scents. Although at a superficial level the sense of smell might seem very
similar to the sensory mechanisms manifested in colors and sounds, such an
assumption, and any such extrapolations as may rely upon such an assumption,
are fraught with error. Only once an adequate scientific foundation has been
laid, can an accurate comparison be drawn between scents and both colors and
sounds.
As discussed above, scents are by nature unique and complex, and most
significantly are very subjective relative to detection, recognition and memory.
By comparison, colors and sounds, though bearing superficial similarities to
scents, actually differ dramatically in a series of important respects.
To the extent that scents, colors and sounds are all sensory mechanisms,
they share certain characteristics common to senses in general. For example,
in order for any of the three senses to detect a change in environment, a
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 90.
Id. at 41.
ENGEN, supra note 46, at 16.
Id. at xi.
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stimulus must be initiated at the respective sensory organ, and the impetus for
such stimuli in each situation is a molecular-level energy transfer. However,
colors and sounds transmit their sensory message by means of transfer
mechanisms very different from scents. While the physiochemical interactions
necessary to detect scents require direct physical contact between nasal
receptors and molecules emitted from the source, the energy-encoded
information bearing an object’s colors are transmitted in the medium of light,
and energy-encoded information from a sound source travel through a wave of
transmitted energy across molecules bridging the distance between the source
and the observer.58 As a result, there is a physical segregation between the
source and the observer for colors and sounds, but not for scents. The energybased transfer mechanisms for colors and sounds, limited primarily by energy
transfer mechanics as opposed to molecular dispersion, not only enable colors
and sounds to travel far greater distances than scents, but also facilitate the
transmission of their energy-encoded information through cables and over the
airwaves, unlike scents.
Another striking and fundamental difference between scents and both
colors and sounds is the inability to establish any relational correlation between
different scents, when one of the most well-understood attributes of colors and
sounds is their spectral nature.59 These properties mark a crucial distinction.
While a specific color or sound can readily be compared to a different color or
sound in a simple and convenient manner that is easily utilized and universally
recognized by the general public, scents must suffer through either a complex
scientific analysis or a confusing plethora of verbal descriptors that may lead to
an uncertain result.
It must be pointed out that most of the modification factors for scents,
discussed supra, also have effects on colors and sounds. However, as a
practical matter, the relative impact such factors impart on colors and sounds is
substantially less significant in the context of human observation and
recognition. For example, the observer-source proximity requirements
demanded by scents subjects them to severe limitations in detection and
recognition. Thus, neighboring scents can seriously impact an observer’s
ability to recognize any or all of each scent in the area. In contrast, two objects
sitting side-by-side, each consisting of a different color, may interfere with the
observer’s color perception, but only to a very limited extent.60 The same is
true of sounds, for unless a cacophony greets the ear, a multitude of sounds can
be witnessed and still the observer will be able to identify individual sounds.61

58. ROBERT W. BURNHAM ET AL., COLOR: A GUIDE TO BASIC FACTS AND CONCEPTS 18
(1963); WILLIAM A. YOST & DONALD W. NIELSEN, FUNDAMENTALS OF HEARING 14 (1977).
59. BURNHAM ET AL., supra note 58, at 19; YOST & NIELSEN, supra note 58, at 170.
60. BURNHAM ET AL., supra note 58, at 63.
61. YOST & NIELSEN, supra note 58, at 129.
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In another comparison, while scents bow readily to the whims of the elements,
colors and sounds both share an exceedingly high degree of tolerance to such
factors.62 These differences are only heightened by the series of factors that
can potentially impact or impair an individual’s scent detection and scent
memory associations.
III. SCENTS: NO SENSE UNDER THE LANHAM ACT
Having properly explored in the previous section the physical and
physiological attributes of scents, this section will build on that foundation to
determine whether scents can or should reasonably be afforded trademark
protection. Included will be discussions of several key issues associated with
trademark law and the Lanham Act.
A.

Inherent Confusion Imparts Consumer Confusion

As is evident from the discussion in the preceding section, scents, by their
very nature, are highly subjective. Anyone ever attempting to describe an odor
has encountered the difficulty inherent in communicating that information to
another individual. Accordingly, several questions immediately present
themselves. Upon what basis does one describe an olfactory impression to
another? How can one be sure that the other individual has had similar or
sufficient experiences upon which to compare the description communicated
and arrive at the desired or correct understanding? Even if a sample of the
odor was available and presented, is there any guarantee the second individual
will sense and remember the odor in the same way as the first? What could
influence, or even destroy the proposed communication? Perhaps the second
individual is suffering from a mild headcold, or just drank a cup of herb tea.
What if the second individual was in a different city? An unlimited list of
distortion inducing factors can be imagined that would directly influence or
even preclude the line of communication sought by the two individuals. The
subjective and keenly personal nature of scents guarantees that confusion
would always be present in varying degrees as between two or more
individuals. Hence, it would be dubious indeed to claim that any two
individuals ever had the same true understanding of any given scent.

62. Light moves so rapidly, 186,000 mi/sec, and with such high energy that the minor
deviations in atmospheric conditions that may be encountered relevant to trademark
considerations will impart no significant changes upon the color of the light. BURNHAM ET AL.,
supra note 58, at 39. The speed of sound varies with temperature, density, and humidity of the
air. Sound wavelength varies with the density of air. Since wavelength is directly proportional
to the speed of sound, sounds themselves are sensitive to such environmental conditions.
However, since these factors only result in minor deviations in air density, sounds are likewise
only minimally impacted. YOST & NIELSEN, supra note 58, at 15.
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With respect to trademark protection, the inherent confusion associated
with identification and communication regarding scents translates directly into
unacceptable consumer confusion. In analyzing the potential for confusion,
the Court in In re E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. set forth the factors to be
used in the Federal Circuit and by the Patent and Trademark Office to
determine the existence of a likelihood of confusion between marks.63 The
very first factor on the list addresses the concern over actual similarity between
competing marks.64 Since similarity is based upon consumer perception,
recognition and memory, the weaknesses inherent in the application of these
factors to scents indicates a degradation toward identity, even when little or no
similarity exists on an analytical level.65 Thus, for example, a consumer trying
to recall a scent in order to select a specific scented fiberglass product from a
shelf filled with scented products, may recognize the presence of different
scents but may only be able to perceive the similarities.
Further, two additional factors the Patent and Trademark Office must
consider are the nature and extent of actual and potential confusion (emphasis
added).66 Clearly, if scents are in and of themselves confusing to individuals,
and difficult, if not impossible to communicate, actual confusion already
exists, as does ample potential for additional confusion. For example, should
the consumer seeking a specific scented fiberglass product look to another
customer or a store clerk for aid, any communication would be thwarted by
each individual’s inability to articulate the necessary information accurately.
The first consumer will be unable to explain his needs, and the second
consumer or the clerk, each carrying their own preconceptions concerning
63. The Federal Circuit has identified thirteen factors, the “Du Pont factors,” that are
relevant when analyzing whether a likelihood of confusion exists between two marks, including:
(1) the similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties as to appearance, sound,
connotation and commercial impression; (2) the similarity or dissimilarity and nature of
the goods or services as described in an application or registration in connection with
which a prior mark is in use; (3) the similarity or dissimilarity of established, likely-tocontinue trade channels; (4) the conditions under which and buyers to whom sales are
made, ie., “impulse” vs. careful, sophisticated purchasing; (5) the fame of the prior mark
(sales, advertising, length of use); (6) the number and nature of similar marks in use on
similar goods; (7) the nature and extent of any actual confusion; (8) the length of time
during and conditions under which there has been concurrent use without evidence of
actual confusion; (9) the variety of goods on which a mark is or is not used (house mark,
“family” mark, product mark); (10) the market interface between applicant and the owner
of a prior mark; (11) the extent to which applicant has a right to exclude other from use of
its mark on its goods; (12) the extent of potential confusion, i.e., whether de minimis or
substantial; and (13) any other established fact probative of the effect of use.
In re E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
64. Id.
65. BEVERLY W. PATTISHALL ET AL., TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 177
(1994).
66. Du Pont de Nemours, 476 F.2d at 1361.
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different scents, will be hard pressed to respond correctly. As might be
expected, the confusion associated with recognizing and describing the
distinctive qualities of specific scents translates into an impossible task under
the test of likelihood of confusion. Such examples serve to highlight the
fundamental difficulties in the application of the trademark confusion doctrine
to scents, which alone should preclude the inclusion of scents under the
Lanham Act. Yet further bolstering this argument are additional legal
concerns.
B.

Scent Marks Dissipate Under The Aesthetic Functionality Doctrine

Case law readily acknowledges that commonly understood, strictly
utilitarian applications of scents, including such product features as the
fragrances associated with perfumes and deodorants, violate the Lanham Act
and will not be afforded trademark protection.67 However, as already
illustrated, scents differ markedly from other sensory mechanisms, including
colors and sounds. Therefore, it must be questioned whether those differences
are of such a nature that in the final analysis all scents must necessarily be
classified as utilitarian. This is particularly crucial when considering the
impact of the aesthetic functionality doctrine.
Aesthetic functionality is defined by the Restatement (Third) of Unfair
Competition § 17 (Tentative Draft No. 2, March 23, 1990) as:
A design is functional because of its aesthetic value only if it confers a
significant benefit that cannot be duplicated by the use of alternative designs.
Because of the difficulties inherent in evaluating the aesthetic superiority of a
particular design, a finding of aesthetic functionality generally will be made
only when objective evidence indicates a lack of adequate alternative designs.
Such evidence typically exists only when the range of adequate alternative
designs is limited by either the nature of the design feature or the basis of its
aesthetic appeal. The ultimate test of functionality, as with utilitarian designs,
is whether the recognition of trademark rights would significantly hinder
competition.

The doctrine is intended to flush out those product features that would
otherwise be afforded trademark status, but which intrinsically provide a
definite marketing or commercial advantage that must be made available to all
competitors. In the murky waters of aesthetic marketing the distinctions can be
very difficult to discern. In examining actual trademark applications, the
courts initially applied a strictly utilitarian approach,68 then moved to a broad
interpretation that defined an aesthetic feature as functional even if it only

67. In re Clarke, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1239.
68. Deborah J. Krieger, The Broad Sweep of Aesthetic Functionality: A Threat to Trademark
Protection of Aesthetic Product Features, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 345, 359 (1982).
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impacted a utilitarian or useful purpose of the item.69 However, as declared by
the Court in In re Morton-Norwich Products, Inc., a feature is now considered
aesthetically functional if it is superior in either function or economy of
manufacture.70 Although it is conceded that the second prong of the MortonNorwich test has little bearing on the present analysis, it will be shown that
scents, as a class, fail to pass the first prong en mass.
The argument follows two lines of reasoning. First, because scents
represent a unique sensory mechanism, once added as a feature, they
incorporate an entirely new and marketable dimension into the original
product. Second, scents initiate deep, physiological reactions within the
observer-consumer that serve utilitarian functions. These reactions occur
regardless of whether the scent holds any meaning as to source.
When a consumer chooses between several products, each of the actual
product features that interest that consumer will generally be examined for
quality, at least on a cursory level. It is irrelevant in the context of trademark
protection what weight that consumer ultimately places upon each or any of
those features; so long as the features as a whole represent the actual product
the consumer wishes to purchase, each such feature is functional and not
protectable under the Lanham Act.71 “The functionality doctrine prevents
trademark law, which seeks to promote competition by protecting a firm’s
reputation, from instead inhibiting legitimate competition by allowing a
producer to control a useful product feature.”72 In the context of an inquiry
into functionality, the Federal Circuit agreed with the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals that “[w]hether competition would in fact be hindered is really
the crux of the matter.”73 Of course, the aesthetic functionality doctrine serves
to secure that even aesthetic features fit within this criteria. Hence, under the
functionality doctrine, product features must be primarily non-functional and
cloaking the features with the monopoly of trademark protection must not
hinder competition in order for the feature to be protectable under the Lanham
Act.
Yet scents simply cannot be segregated from their source, either physically
or through memory recall, and while many products may have little or no

69. Id. at 361.
70. In re Morton-Norwich Products Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1339 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
71. Midwest Indus., Inc. v. Karavan Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d 1356, 1361-62 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(citations omitted) (“To guard against such anti-competitive effects, the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals invoked the doctrine of ‘functionality’ to limit the scope of trade dress protection.
The court held that a seller of goods could not obtain trademark protection for a trade dress or
product configuration that was primarily utilitarian, or ‘functional.’ The court then defined as
‘functional’ any feature that possessed such utility that its protection would hinder competition.”).
72. Id. at 1362.
73. Id. at 1361 (quoting with approval In re Mogen David Wine Corp., 328 F.2d 925, 933
(C.C.P.A. 1964) (additional citations omitted)).
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readily discernible scent, all products have colors and configurations. Thus,
again looking at fiberglass insulation as an example, instead of arbitrarily
changing an existing feature such as color from yellow to pink, adding a scent
would change the entire product from generic, having virtually no scent, to,
e.g., a plumeria scented fiberglass insulation. That is, the change incorporated
by adding an “arbitrary” scent to a product is so dramatically different from
merely changing an already existing feature, that the result will be an entirely
new product. As a result, the new product in the fiberglass example will be
“plumeria scented fiberglass insulation,” not merely fiberglass insulation that
happens to smell like flowers.
Furthermore, unlike other product features, scents impart memory
associated impressions on the consumer which result in a very real
personalization to the product. While this effect will vary from consumer to
consumer, and the individual reactions elicited due to the effect may be
difficult to ascertain, none the less when scents are added to a product, they
manifest in a functional feature. Referring again to the fiberglass once the
manufacturer has the product smelling like plumeria blossoms, any consumer
not affected with anosmia, and in the vicinity of the product will have little
choice in either consciously or unconsciously sampling that aesthetic feature of
the fiberglass insulation. Although a positive reaction to the scent cannot be
guaranteed, one of the scent’s aesthetic functions has already succeeded;
attracting the attention of potential customers. Assuming that the manufacturer
has conducted an adequate market study and has ascertained that fiberglass
insulation buyers, as a group, do indeed favor the scent of plumeria, blossoms,
the scent then fulfills its second aesthetic function by pleasing the
manufacturer’s actual and potential purchasers. At this point, the scent may
actually help serve as an indicator of source (disregarding for the moment all
the subjective and detection hurdles associated with scents), but clearly, that
protectable function is inconsequential since the aesthetically functional
features of the scent provide the insulation with a superiority of function.
Recalling the Restatement definition of aesthetic functionality, it might be
argued that competition would not be unduly burdened by scent marks since
competitors have a wealth of alternatives available to them, and they could
simply select a different scent for their own products. However, this argument
is improperly placed. As stated by the court in Morton-Norwich, “there exists
a fundamental right to compete through imitation of a competitor’s
product . . .”74 Thus, the mere possibility that an alternative product can be
developed cannot serve as a bar to permitting competitive imitation. Taken as
a whole, the incorporation of a new product dimension and the advent of
additional functional aesthetic features make adding an “arbitrary” scent to a
product tantamount to creating an entirely new product, and not simply a new
74. Id. at 1334.
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product identity. As a result, the aesthetic functionality doctrine effectively
precludes serious consideration of granting scents trademark protection.
C. Secondary Meaning: To Be Or Not To Be
It must be conceded up front that scents, by their very nature, must be
possessed of a secondary meaning since each scent is stored by the brain as a
memory association referenced to some other sensory impression. This would
certainly appear to argue favorably for adopting their use as trademarks.
However, in order to show secondary meaning under the Lanham Act, a mark
must point the consumer in the direction of some independent source75, and
there simply is no guarantee that scents represent a reliable mechanism to
convey such an important message absent confusion. Hence, whether scents
are capable of attaining secondary meaning in the trademark sense is a difficult
question at best. Fortunately, the answer no longer need be found.
In order to manage the multitude of differences in distinctiveness among
traditional trademarks, a judicial glossary slowly evolved that now
incorporates a series of definitions for terms used to describe alpha-marks.76
Unfortunately, just as in the case of trade dress, the protectable overall visual
image of a product or service, none of these descriptors can properly be used to
discuss scents. The decision in Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana remedied this
situation by declaring that a showing of secondary meaning is not required for
inherently distinctive trade dress to gain trademark protection under the
Lanham Act.77 In its decision, the Supreme Court accepted the impossibility
of attempting to apply verbal descriptors to strictly visual impressions, and in
so doing has allowed subsequent trade dress claims to speak for themselves if
they exhibit inherent distinctiveness.
Yet not every example of trade dress is inherently distinctive. Where the
inherent distinctiveness of a particular trade dress must be ascertained, the
Chevron test provides guidance. This test states that even when a trade dress
lacks secondary meaning, protection will be granted if “the features of the
trade dress sought to be protected are arbitrary and serve no function either to
describe the product or assist in its effective packaging . . .”78 At this juncture
we may quickly dispense with the question of whether scents are inherently
distinctive and thereby protectable under the Lanham Act. For having already
fully explored the aesthetic functionality doctrine and found that added scents
are indeed functional features, and in fact actually transform the original

75. Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready, Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 370 (7th Cir. 1976).
76. Big O Tire Dealers, Inc. v. The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 561 F.2d 1365 (10th Cir.
1977).
77. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 771 (1992).
78. Chevron Chem. Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc., 659 F.2d 695, 702 (5th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1126 (1982).
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product into a new product altogether, it becomes clear that under the Chevron
test, scents do function as product descriptors and therefore cannot have
inherent distinctiveness.
D. Administrative Nightmares
One of the more apparent areas of conflict for assimilating scents into the
trademark umbrella is coping with administrative difficulties involved in the
effort. Armed with an understanding of osphresiology, the reader can now
better understand the reasons behind the difficulties and grasp the extent of the
problem. Because of the complexity of exploring each of these issues, only the
difficulties associated with registration will be examined in depth, while other
prominent concerns will be mentioned in passing.
How will the trademark be registered? One apparently simple approach
might be to store a registration sample of the product at some Patent and
Trademark Office warehouse. But a physical sample would soon lose its
potency, and would be subject to contamination from other vital samples in the
warehouse. In any event, just how large of a sample will be required to meet
all of the needs of the Patent and Trademark Office? Each examiner may need
to utilize a part of the sample for comparative analyses against new
applications, for oppositions and cancellation proceedings, and for
infringement claims. Likewise, should an infringement case reach the courts,
more samples, from a dedicated and registered source, may again be called for.
Even this limited list of problems point out the impossibility of the option, and
that another method must be found.
Another apparently simple approach would be to require the applicant to
submit a non-comparative written description of the scent that would be
retained on file. However, the flaws in this approach are just as simple;
accurate scent descriptions cannot effectively be communicated through
language. All of the personal perceptions, biases, and physical limitations
would frustrate any such attempt. Furthermore, this approach will unduly
burden the system with unmanageable strife during the processing of each
scent claim, since the claimant will undoubtedly seek to register a description
as vague as possible to attain the broadest possible protection while the
Examiner will look for a narrow and specific description for ease in
administration. Without a context within which to even frame such a dispute,
both the applicant and the Examiner would merely be drawing proverbial lines
in the sand with both ignorant of where the desert was located. But suppose
the registration applicant merely described the scent as “rose”?
Unfortunately, relying upon well recognized scents, even those as often
discussed as that of a rose, provides no safe harbor from inherent confusion.
Any attempt to capture in words the essence of the rose’s scent will fail.
Consider: The scent is sweet. It is fragrant, not pungent, and floral in nature. It
might be argued that a rose carries a musty component. Some might say it has
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a fruity component, others would disagree. The number of available common
descriptors thereafter soon wanes. Direct comparisons to other scents would
be no more than shooting at a moving target, since the comparison scents
would suffer the same problems as the rose scent. Yet without the use of
comparisons, the description quickly and irreparably stumbles.
A third option might be to describe the differences between the subject
scent and other scents such as those associated with, for example, a gym
locker, a carp, or a pine tree. While offering the pretence of recognition, this
method, too, is fraught with pitfalls. For example, how different is the smell of
a rose from that of a lilac, a tulip, or a chrysanthemum? While one person may
identify certain smells with a rose, another person may identify the same
smells with any of a myriad of other flowers. In fact, for all the items that can
be named with scents that differ greatly from that of a rose, there are a similar
number that differ only slightly. Furthermore, even in this simplistic example,
numerous questions arise, such as: Should the claimant choose a red rose or a
white rose?; Should the rose be just budding, in full bloom, or fading?; Is there
a standard growing environment for all rose bushes such that their blooms all
smell exactly the same? These, and other questions, undermine the certainty of
identification necessary for effective trademark registration. Hence, in the end,
even seemingly well known scents do not have the recognition potential
demanded of a trademark.
Rejecting the first three options, a more complex registration alternative
would be to generate an energy plot of the scent and secure the plot in a file.
Certainly, in this manner the true identity of the specific scent would be
recorded. However, since it is quite possible to replicate a scent by matching
as few as three vibrational peaks, and since very similar scents may have
entirely different spectral plots, the potential for proliferation of confusingly
similar scents cannot be overlooked. Furthermore, given the very narrow focus
of the infrared plots, and the accordingly narrow protection thus afforded, it is
doubtful such protection would generate much interest from potential
claimants. Consequently, as with the previous two approaches, the practical
difficulties associated with a system based upon retaining infrared plots
outweigh any potential benefits.
The problems associated with registration are only the very first to be
encountered. As the process continues, serious unanswerable questions will
arise concerning infringement. For example, on a fundamental level, what
would constitute infringement of a scent mark? That is, how similar is too
similar? A quick cross-reference to the discussion of registration above will
highlight the extremely nebulous nature of such questions. Even if a
recordation standard is ultimately established, how will infringement be
regulated and enforced? Is there any effective testing procedure that can be
feasibly administered in an infringement suit? If a jury is seated, will each be
required to ascertain the similarities between competing scents? How can
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either party in such a suit possibly hope to recognize, much less speak to the
subjective perceptive scent memories of each juror and the judge, particularly
when the judge and jury are unable articulate the memories themselves? What
types of criteria must be met before an individual is qualified to sit on such a
jury? While such questions are daunting, it is perhaps even more disturbing
that the answers are as evasive and insubstantial as the scent memories that are
causing them to be asked.
E.

Depletion

The doctrine of depletion provides that trademark protection will be
refused for a potential mark if the foundation for the claim has a limited
number of possible variations and would restrict the number of potential
competitors entering the market, thus unfairly hindering competition.79 Prior
to the Lanham Act, depletion theory was applied by courts to all forms of trade
dress when applicants sought to protect basic designs and features of their
products.80 However, subsequent to passage of the Lanham Act, the primary
focus of debate over the depletion doctrine has centered on colors.81
Two characteristics of colors provide fuel for a difficult and heated debate
over the applicability of the doctrine. One side of the argument posits that
since colors are defined by a continuous spectrum reaching from the infrared at
one end to the ultraviolet at the other, there exist, by definition, an infinite
number of colors available for trademarks.82 However, the opposing argument
holds that since only a select few primary colors are readily recognizable, and
all other colors are merely blends of the primaries,83 that from a practical
standpoint a given market will rapidly be depleted of all primary colors.84
While the argument still merits consideration, in approving trademark
protection for the color “pink,” the court in In re Owens-Corning Fiberglass
Corp. interjected another perspective by establishing that situations presenting
a lack of competitive need will moot the argument altogether and allow for
protection in spite of theoretically possible depletion.85 Hence, in approving a
trademark for color per se, the Owens-Corning court sidestepped the argument
central to the depletion doctrine, and concentrated on practical concerns over
monopolistic potential.
In light of the Owens-Corning decision, particularly since the mark in
question was a color, proving that the depletion doctrine must still be

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Campbell Soup v. Armour & Co., 175 F.2d 795, 799 (3rd Cir. 1949).
Morton-Norwich, 671 F.2d at 1336.
Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1120.
Id. at 1122.
BURNHAM ET AL., supra note 58, at 119.
Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1120.
Id. at 1122.
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considered with regard to scents becomes at the same time straightforward and
problematic. Obviously, the primary argument concerning depletion can now
be easily answered and set aside. Since scents are discrete and essentially
random in nature, and therefore lack any spectral attributes, the first side of the
argument must be vacated. Thus, the depletion doctrine would appear to
readily apply to scents. However, the decision in Owens-Corning cannot be so
easily dispensed with. For if the premise of Owens-Corning is that depletion
should be recognized only when commerce is threatened by monopoly, then
the lack of commercial interest in scent marks since In re Clarke would imply
that scents do not suffer from that potential threat. The answer to this apparent
enigma lies in the very argument that undermines the commercial justification
for granting scent marks.
IV. COMMERCIAL CENTS
It might well be argued that if scent marks actually create monopolies and
represent a valid threat to competition, that following In re Clarke,
manufacturers and merchants would be flooding the Patent and Trademark
Office with scent mark applications. However, that flood has been the smallest
of trickles.86 Of these applications, four have been abandoned, one is being
opposed, and three have been allowed. This, of course, begs the question; if
scent marks are so commercially significant, why has there been such a dearth
of applications over the past decade? The simple answer is that the market,
ahead of the legal community, already understands the inherent limitations of
such “marks.” It is hoped this commentary will provide the reader with as
much or more understanding than may already exist in the market.
Of course, markets can be fickle. Should greater interest in scent marks
somehow kindle, it is not difficult to imagine rows of similar goods on a store
shelf, each with its own registered scent, competing with one another for the
limited olfactory capabilities of the consumers who wander by. Aside from
potentially repelling the very consumers being sought to entice, such an
olfactory onslaught can only lead to a confusing cacophony. Further, as scents
are wont to do, each of these products’ smells will drift on the wind and violate
the airspace of its competitors. A race for the most potent scent sources with
the most lingering and overpowering qualities will ensue, resulting in a haze of
oppressive odors that eventually mask all of the marks combined. Businesses
instinctively or empirically weigh such pitfalls against any potential benefit of
a scent mark in a business expenditure analysis.
From the practical standpoint of running a business, each expenditure must
be weighed in light of what and how much potential benefit the business will
gain as a return, with the result classified as return on investment. As already

86. See supra note 29.
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discussed, scents differ greatly from traditional symbol and device trademarks,
and suffer from several distinct and important disadvantages. The significance
of these drawbacks has apparently not been lost upon the business community,
particularly in light of the potential costs of establishing and maintaining a
trademark.87 Although it is theoretically possible to establish an extremely
strong association between a scent and a product, from a business standpoint
this is likely greatly outweighed by the risks associated with obtaining a scent
mark, including: potential for confusion, proximity requirements, inability to
transmit the mark, preexisting customer perceptions, packaging and labeling
concerns, and unknown scope of trademark protection. Any or all of these
risks could eliminate the return on investment charged to obtaining a scent
mark. As a result, it is likely businesses have simply concluded that any
available marketing funds would be better spent elsewhere.
V. IN RE CLARKE: THE DECISION MADE IN THE DARK
“We did this as a kind of gimmick . . .”88
At the heart of the In re Clarke decision is a single fundamental question:
Are consumers purchasing the scented products because the fragrance assures
them they are receiving a specific product from a specific source, or, are they
purchasing the product because the idea of a using scented yarn appeals to
them? Although all of the Board’s arguments are ancillary to this question,
each will be addressed in turn.
The Board found it significant that Clarke was the only person to market
scented yarns and threads, and emphasized the scent in her advertising.89 But
merely because she put out verbal advertising that said her yarn was scented
like “plumeria blossoms” provides no assurance that if a consumer were to
smell that scent, it would remind them of her yarn. In addition, while
advertising and marketing expenditures do play a role in determining whether a
trademark has attained a secondary meaning, the significance here is irrelevant
given the relationship between scents and secondary meaning.
The fact that Clarke was able to demonstrate that customers, dealers, and
distributors recognize her as the source for her scented products,90 is likewise
unconvincing. At the time of the decision, Clarke was the only person
marketing scented yarn and thread.91 With no other sources available, and

87. Owen-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1125 (In advertising alone, Owens-Corning spent over $42
million to promote “pink” for its fiberglas products.).
88. Gladwell, supra note 28.
89. In re Clarke, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1239-40.
90. Id. at l240.
91. Id. at 1239.
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given the novelty of the product, it would be surprising to find that those
individuals did not identify her as the source at that time.
As already demonstrated, any reliance on colors or sounds to justify
granting protection is misplaced. In Clarke, the Board reiterated, with
apparent approval, the Clarke brief, citing Owens-Corning and drawing a
comparison between the color “pink” and the scent of plumeria blossoms.92
Again, the Owens-Corning decision bears little weight on the issue at hand,
and the In re Clarke Board therefore erred in adopting the applicant’s analogy
arguments. Perhaps the one justification the Board reasonably relied upon was
the liberalization of trademark law under the Lanham Act and the expansive
definition of trademarks according to the Commission.93 Yet, even a lay
understanding of the science underlying the scent phenomenon leads to the
inescapable conclusion that in spite of the Commission’s position, scents are
not suited to be trademarks.
Having set aside each of the Board’s arguments, we now return to the
question first presented in this section. Although we lack the benefit of a
proper survey, it seems improbable that Clarke’s customers would purchase a
scented yarn or thread, and put up with the smell for the prolonged periods of
time required for most craft activities, only to insure they bought the correct
product. Would, for example, Clarke’s customers purchase the yarn if the
scent was that of mustard or dung? Rather, it seems much more likely that a
pleasant scent could be a highly desirable feature for a product that could make
craft activities more enjoyable to the purchasing consumer. This, of course,
goes full circle to functionality.
Finally, two small, yet significant details concerning the In re Clarke case
shed additional light on this important question. The first item, easily
overlooked in the details of the Board’s brief decision, was the fact that one of
articles placed on record for evidence by Clarke was a thread and yarn craft kit
“for making a scented skunk.”94 It is doubtful that the kit would have value, or
indeed even be the same product, without yarn and thread that was scented.
At the very top of this section is the second item, a quote made by
applicant Celia Clarke concerning her scent mark application: “We did this as
a kind of gimmick . . .” 95 While one must applaud her honesty, one must also
question Ms. Clarke’s sincerity in pursuing the application for any legitimate
business purpose. That a landmark decision concerning the Lanham Act
should be decided because of a whimsical desire on the part of some applicant,
when the Lanham Act was implemented to aid businesses in legitimate

92.
93.
94.
95.

Id.
In re Clarke, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1240.
Id. at 1239.
Gladwell, supra note 28.
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marketing concerns, serves to highlight the distortions surrounding the entire
concept of scent marks.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although the Lanham Act was intended to liberalize trademark law and
expand the scope of protection afforded product identifiers in order to meet the
evolving needs of business, scents were not originally contemplated by the
drafters, and only through subsequent interpretation has the door been opened
to their inclusion. Yet, any scents that pass through that door will be riding in
upon an ill wind. The very nature of scents is such that they are inherently
confusing, and in any application will impart functional attributes to a product.
Furthermore, any possible benefit businesses may be derived from utilizing
scent marks will be vastly overshadowed by the administrative burden their
management will impose and the regulation and enforcement quagmire they
present. Thus, in spite of the decision in In re Clarke there simply exists no
business need for scent marks, and granting trademark protection to scents flies
in the face of the Lanham Act’s purpose. Scents are unfit for trademark
consideration and the entrance into the umbrella of protection under the
Lanham Act should be closed.

